Do you think the US war machine gives a damn about the welfare of their saliors and officers?
I think the sailors and officers in the region care. And I think it becomes increasingly difficult to manage a military when your frontline units are constantly flinching and cowering. IEDs in Iraq weren’t just about killing individual occupying soldiers. They increasingly bottled troop units up in their bases and “Green Zones”. The Highway of Death was no joke. Then, on a prolonged scale, they fractured Bush’s already-reluctant “coalition of the willing” and depressed recruitment at home and forced politicians and officers to wade through scandal after scandal as public opinion soured on the war.
The USS Cole bombing had a profound negative impact on public perception of military readiness. It was not eclipsed by the relative success of the US invasion of the Balkins during the Bosnian/Kosovo War or the success of Desert Shield in repelling Iraqis from Kuwait. But while we were in Iraq and Afghanistan, we were having convoys and bases hit practically every day. Hugely demoralizing for anyone interested in making a career as a US soldier.
Do you doubt the eagerness of the US war machine to make more weapons sales?
I doubt the capacity of production, given how much we’ve padded out the process of construction and distribution. Building at scale in the modern era has proved an insurmountable obstacle. That’s fine when we only do a few high profile engagements every couple of years. But in a protracted multi-front war spanning the entire rim of the Asian continent? And when you consider the sheer volume of shipping moving along the coast?
The whole reason we have a Navy to begin with is to defer the need for every merchant vessel to keep its own on-board company of marines. I’m sure someone would love to profit off a new need to arm every shipping container from Kenya to Kyoto. But that person isn’t on the board of Maersk.
I think the sailors and officers in the region care. And I think it becomes increasingly difficult to manage a military when your frontline units are constantly flinching and cowering. IEDs in Iraq weren’t just about killing individual occupying soldiers. They increasingly bottled troop units up in their bases and “Green Zones”. The Highway of Death was no joke. Then, on a prolonged scale, they fractured Bush’s already-reluctant “coalition of the willing” and depressed recruitment at home and forced politicians and officers to wade through scandal after scandal as public opinion soured on the war.
The USS Cole bombing had a profound negative impact on public perception of military readiness. It was not eclipsed by the relative success of the US invasion of the Balkins during the Bosnian/Kosovo War or the success of Desert Shield in repelling Iraqis from Kuwait. But while we were in Iraq and Afghanistan, we were having convoys and bases hit practically every day. Hugely demoralizing for anyone interested in making a career as a US soldier.
I doubt the capacity of production, given how much we’ve padded out the process of construction and distribution. Building at scale in the modern era has proved an insurmountable obstacle. That’s fine when we only do a few high profile engagements every couple of years. But in a protracted multi-front war spanning the entire rim of the Asian continent? And when you consider the sheer volume of shipping moving along the coast?
The whole reason we have a Navy to begin with is to defer the need for every merchant vessel to keep its own on-board company of marines. I’m sure someone would love to profit off a new need to arm every shipping container from Kenya to Kyoto. But that person isn’t on the board of Maersk.