Your link is broken/bad copy-paste - it’s the same link for both citations - share plz?
Pravda is the Ukrainian state media. Not to say it’s a 100% unfounded propaganda mouthpiece, but I wouldn’t consider Voice of America or Radio Liberty unbiased and take their word without independent verification. They have a vested interest in spinning reality to make themselves look favorable (which is logical during war) whilst maintaining enough credibility to not be outright dismissed.
I had cautious optimism for the 2023 counteroffensive, but I got hugboxed by my own media bubble. I still think the war is Ukraine’s to win (provided they aren’t abandoned by us) and they play their cards strategically.
There is a limit to how successful Ukraine can be. It was suffering from a shortage of troops to rotate and hold the line prior to its operation in Kursk. Now it has pulled together what was available as an operational reserve and committed it to a new axis. There is a limit to how far this force can push before it overextends, meaning it will need to dig in soon if the Ukrainians are to hold the ground until negotiations. But as soon as the front stops being dynamic, the Russians will dig defences and then bring up artillery, electronic warfare complexes and fresh troops. In the short term, the operation has diverted the weight of Russian air-delivered bombs away from Donbas, but this will be temporary. Russia has enough personnel and equipment to fight both fronts. It is less clear that this is true for Ukraine.
Fixed the links in my previous comment. In the afforementioned RUSI podcast they essentially say the same thing as you say Sept. 4th but also predict withdrawal 2 months later at best. We’re 4 months in and they’ve made a second push (though nowhere near as hard or effective afaic see).
Point is, ~50k troops were pulled from the front line and the artillery imbalance favouring russia reduced to a quarter what it was previous to the counter-invasion. That level of redeployment alone causes disarray and fosters opportunities to take advantage of the confusion which, IMO, explain the high level of losses seen of late. If you look at how the front line moves from Toretsk and northward russian advances come to a halt (while admittedly southward/Prokrovsk is bad the whole time) for over a month before resuming at a pace nowhere near that seen during Bahkmut offensive.
We can armchair general all we want, but Kursk happened and continues to do so. Even with NK reinforcements cracks in russia’s assault are showing and Kursk went a long way to making that happen which makes it a ‘good’ thing not even including the political and morale implications.
Side note regarding UA sourcing bias: I find you can practically modify numbers by 20% and that usually brings them to within those provided by other ‘neutral’ sources, so when UA says 60k russian troops moved 50k is the number I hear in my head. Other than that they are usually reliable and far better than RU sources.
Genuinely not trying to nit pick but:
I had cautious optimism for the 2023 counteroffensive, but I got hugboxed by my own media bubble. I still think the war is Ukraine’s to win (provided they aren’t abandoned by us) and they play their cards strategically.
In contrast, here’s the RUSI take
Fixed the links in my previous comment. In the afforementioned RUSI podcast they essentially say the same thing as you say Sept. 4th but also predict withdrawal 2 months later at best. We’re 4 months in and they’ve made a second push (though nowhere near as hard or effective afaic see).
Point is, ~50k troops were pulled from the front line and the artillery imbalance favouring russia reduced to a quarter what it was previous to the counter-invasion. That level of redeployment alone causes disarray and fosters opportunities to take advantage of the confusion which, IMO, explain the high level of losses seen of late. If you look at how the front line moves from Toretsk and northward russian advances come to a halt (while admittedly southward/Prokrovsk is bad the whole time) for over a month before resuming at a pace nowhere near that seen during Bahkmut offensive.
We can armchair general all we want, but Kursk happened and continues to do so. Even with NK reinforcements cracks in russia’s assault are showing and Kursk went a long way to making that happen which makes it a ‘good’ thing not even including the political and morale implications.
Side note regarding UA sourcing bias: I find you can practically modify numbers by 20% and that usually brings them to within those provided by other ‘neutral’ sources, so when UA says 60k russian troops moved 50k is the number I hear in my head. Other than that they are usually reliable and far better than RU sources.